El presente artículo parte de exponer y analizar dos niveles en el camino metafísico de Heidegger, diferentes mas relacionados recíprocamente: de una parte, el de la crítica al presente, marcado por la cultura del pesimismo que se nutre del desprecio de la civilización técnico-industrial; y, de otra parte, el de la desesperación ontológico existencial anclado en la pérdida epocal de la pregunta por el sentido del ser, la cual comporta, en consecuencia, la imposibilidad de una apropiación individual e histórica de (...) la verdad del ser. (shrink)

This article discusses the possibilities of the ontology of hospitality running across the categories of angst, responsibility and aporia. In this way it seeks to address the radical finitude of our concrete death, incorporating the needed, existentive, and ontic considerations of dying, which the heideggerian previous attempt moved away as irrelevant, being not original ones to philosophical reflection. This recovery does not mean, absolutely not, that death and dying have lost their true character and perplexing mystery, or that they have (...) dissolved the very nature of our aporetic existence. Rather, death is and will remain being such an indeterminate and always present concern, restlessness disturbing thought, as beautifully as Schopenhauer had said before: "death is the true inspirational genius or Musagetes of philosophy". (shrink)

This article analyzes self-disconnection as a phenomenological characterization of a destructive disease such as Alzheimer’s. We want to show that, in the most extreme cases of its development, the patient sinks into emotional disengagement because of the destructive plasticity that affects them. This isolation implies an emotional challenge for family members who observe that their loved one becomes disconnected and that they cannot do anything to prevent it. However, family members seek to assist their loved one in their marginalization. The (...) scope of this accompaniment reveals the human experience of consolation as an intersubjective response to this disconnection. The analysis of this disconnection reveals, in a paradoxical way, the human need to put distance in the face of extreme suffering, and at the same time shows its limit. The anthropological analysis of the devices of actio per distans can offer transcendental support to the ethics of tenderness in the face of the experience of illness. (shrink)

The present work analyzes the various expressions of the corporeal condition of human existence, from the complex, social and cultural construction of the subject and the subjectivities in Modernity, and works the metaphors of bodies (in their soma and in their psyche which are intimately linked with embodiment) disdained, mutilated and painful that are put on the scene of Latin American society, projecting what is admitted and what is forbidden, in the places of memory of resistances and dominations. Here, a (...) problematic relationship is drawn to the order and corporeal cosmos of history and society; In this way, the book expands an analysis by an inter and transdisciplinary history of the body in terms of symbolic construction and power-knowledge relations, which make it a field of events, a terrain of marriage of technical, linguistic and psychosocial devices in the aesthetic and suffering framework of the human and in the processes of subjectivation of the world. (shrink)

En el presente texto abordamos a la luz de la antropología filosófica la pregunta por nuestra experiencia de la enfermedad. Como seres dotados de palabra, esta experiencia está mediada siempre por nuestra manera de hablar sobre ella. El poder nombrar lo que nos pasa nos configura como individuos orgánicos peculiares, frente a otras formas de vida. Pero al hablar sobre nuestras enfermedades caemos en una profunda paradoja: tenemos la necesidad de comunicar a otros nuestra vivencia, que es algo tan íntimo (...) y privado que individualiza; de otra parte, la comprensión de los otros de lo que nos pasa encuentra, sin embargo, un límite casi infranqueable. A menudo, este límite suele ser bordeado por la metáfora y su lenguaje traslaticio. Queremos examinar, a continuación, la relación que podemos establecer entre enfermedad, dolor y metáfora. (shrink)

On behalf of the School of Philosophy, I would like to welcome you to our University on the occasion of the sixteenth annual meeting of the Comparative and Continental Philosophy Circle. Your prese...

Leonardo Polo no es un filósofo cualquiera. Según Google Scholar es uno de los filósofos más citados en el campo de la antropología filosófica, tanto en español como en inglés. Este estudio presenta el proyecto PODIUN y explora diversas alternativas para la creación de un corpus digital destinado a mejorar la calidad de la investigación científica así como la difusión de su filosofía. Lo que aquí se presenta supone el punto de partida hacia una investigación de lingüística computacional cada vez (...) más articulada, incluyendo técnicas de inteligencia artificial. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

The representational nature of human cognition and thought in general has been a source of controversies. This is particularly so in the context of studies of unconscious cognition, in which representations tend to be ontologically and structurally segregated with regard to their conscious status. However, it appears evolutionarily and developmentally unwarranted to posit such segregations, as,otherwise, artifact structures and ontologies must be concocted to explain them from the viewpoint of the human cognitive architecture. Here, from a by-and-large Classical cognitivist viewpoint, (...) I show why this segregation is wrong, and elaborate on the need to postulate an ontological and structural continuity between unconscious and conscious representations. Specifically, I hypothesize that this continuity is to be found in the symbolic-based interplay between the syntax and the semantics of thought, and I propose a model of human information processing characterized by the integration of syntactic and semantic representations. (shrink)

The traditional model of human cognition (TMHC) postulates an ontological and/or structural gap between conscious and unconscious mental representations. By and large, it sees higher-level mental processes as commonly conceptual or symbolic in nature and therefore conscious, whereas unconscious, lower-level representations are conceived as non-conceptual or sub-symbolic. However, experimental evidence belies this model, suggesting that higher-level mental processes can be, and often are, carried out in a wholly unconscious way and/or without conceptual representations, and that these can be processed unconsciously. (...) This entails that the TMHC, as well as the theories on mental representation it motivates and that in turn support it, is wrong. (shrink)

We prove that a combinatorial consequence of the negation of the PCF conjecture for intervals, involving free subsets relative to set mappings, is not implied by even the strongest known large cardinal axiom.

Sustainable development is often framed as a social issue to which corporations should pay attention because it offers both opportunities and challenges. Through the use of institutional theory and the resource-based view of the firm, we shed some light on why, more than 20 years after sustainable development was first introduced, we see neither the adoption of this business model as dominant nor its converse, that is the total abandonment of the model as unworkable and unprofitable. We focus on multinational (...) corporations (MNCs) because they were among the organizations first called to take action. In order to illustrate the institutional pressures MNCs face and their strategic response to these pressures, we analysed four major oil and gas multinationals subject to similar sustainable development pressures – climate change, biodiversity, renewable energy development and social investment. We argue that normative and coercive isomorphism does not occur at the global level because sustainable development is largely a stakeholder-driven rather than a broad social pressure. That is, host country interpretation of sustainable development pressures varies across an MNC’s subsidiary network. Based on the analysis of the four major MNCs’ annual reports from 2000 to 2005, we argue that mimetic isomorphism may occur, but since it implies the use of complex and intangible resources, mimetic processes are slow, rare and discretionary. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

¿Qué es la experiencia? ¿Cómo se constituye? Una aproximación común a estas preguntas supone que el entendimiento es un epifenómeno que emerge de la percepción sensorial. Luis Miguel Isava retoma estas interrogantes y desarrolla una propuesta muy distinta: la experiencia no se produce a partir del percibir, entendido como acto originario y no mediado, sino que tiene lugar a partir de ciertas condiciones de posibilidad de tipo formal. Para Isava este requisito funciona efectivamente como un protocolo: se trata de (...) un sistema de criterios formales que efectivamente organizan y le otorgan sentido a lo percibido y así lo «sancionan» como experiencia. Los protocolos que hacen posible la experiencia están arraigados tan profundamente en la cultura que pueden resultarnos invisibles y «naturales», pero en realidad son cambiantes. Distintas culturas, en distintos momentos históricos, fundan cada una sus experiencias en base a protocolos diferentes. Esto puede resultar evidente al momento de considerar los procesos de encuentro entre culturas disímiles que han ocurrido a lo largo de la historia. Sin embargo, Isava se enfoca en un problema menos obvio y más sugerente: ¿qué ocurre cuando en el seno de una misma cultura aparecen objetos que, bajo los protocolos vigentes, no pueden ser asimilables como experiencia? Esta posibilidad, nos muestra Isava, podemos hallarla en el arte, o más exactamente, en lo que él denomina los "artefactos culturales" de la modernidad. A partir de ejemplos concretos tomados de la poesía, la pintura, el cine y la música, Isava muestra cómo el arte puede suscitar momentos extraños, reflexivos o críticos que, al enfrentarse con los protocolos de la experiencia ya establecidos, pueden suscitar nuevas formas de estar en el mundo. (shrink)

Indirect Nature and the Colors of the Invisible. Notes regarding Merleau-Ponty’s Ontological ProjectThis paper aims to meditate on the importance of the Notes de cours du Collège de France on the idea of “Nature” to the understanding of M. Merleau-Ponty ontological project. In particular, we would like to show that in these notes a Philosophy of Nature is drawn both in view of a necessary conception of Being that surpasses the ontology of the object, and in view of a new (...) philosophy of the incarnated perceiving body. In the center of this fertile tension we hope to contribute to a new way of understanding what Merleau-Ponty was still trying to do with his Le visible et l’invisible.La Natura indiretta e i colori dell’invisibile. Note sul progetto ontologico di Merleau-PontyLo scopo di questo articolo è di riflettere sull’importanza delle Lezioni al Collège de France sull’idea di “Natura” per la comprensione del progetto ontologico di M. Merleau-Ponty. In particolare, intendiamo mostrare come in queste lezioni sia tracciata una filosofia della natura in vista di una nuova concezione dell’Essere che superi l’ontologia dell’oggetto, ma anche di una nuova filosofia del corpo percipiente incarnato. Nella scia di questa fertile tensione, speriamo di poter contribuire ad una nuova comprensione di ciò che Merleau-Ponty stava cercando di fare con il suo Il visibile e l’invisibile. (shrink)

Este texto se escribió y se publicó como parte de las celebraciones del 80 aniversario del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Iberoamericana, Ciudad de México.